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,\Ii) 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(f) and (4). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellants Utah Alunite Corp. ("UAC") and Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration ("SITLA") appeal the dismissal of their petition seeking judicial 
review of an order of Appellee Kent L. Jones (the "State Engineer") approving an 
application to appropriate water. UAC and SITLA petitioned for judicial review of the 
State Engineer's order pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a). That statute, which 
specifically governs the right of judicial review of such orders, allows "[a] person 
aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" to obtain judicial review in accordance with 
Title 63G, Chapter 4 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAP A"). 
Inferring a term into the text of Section 73-3-14(l)(a) that does not exist, the 
district court found only a "party" to the underlying adjudicative proceeding is allowed to 
seek judicial review under the statute. As explained below, UAC and SITLA had no 
opportunity to participate in that proceeding because the State Engineer waited nearly 
eight years to rule on the application in question. Finding UAC and SITLA were not 
parties to the proceeding, the district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. But the circumstances of this case are not so simple-UAC and 
SITLA have a direct and competing interest in the same water. And even though they 
were unable to maintain party status, the State Engineer issued the order after fully 
considering UAC and SITLA's competing interest in the application. 
UAC and SITLA appeal and raise the following issues: 
- 1 -
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ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court err in holding that UAC and SITLA must be 
"parties" to obtain judicial review of an order of the State Engineer when Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a) allows a "person aggrieved" by the order to seek judicial review? 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for 
correctness and affords no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Marion 
Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,r 12,267 P.3d 863. 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the district court in briefing in support 
· of and in opposition to the State Engineer's motion to dismiss. (R.55-57, 78-79, 92-95, 
271-72, 307-11.) The district court addressed the issue in its order granting the motion to \v· 
dismiss. (R.356-58.) 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the district court err when it failed to consider whether UAC 
and SITLA satisfied exceptions to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies 
under Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-401(2)(b)? 
Standard of Review: When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must 
"accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences 
from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, ,I 2, 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets 
omitted). A district court's dismissal of a claim for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies is reviewed for correctness. See id. at ,r 9. As noted, the district court's 
interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ,r 12. 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the district court in UAC and SITLA's " 
petition for judicial review (R.9-10), and in briefing in support of and in opposition to the 
- 2 -
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State Engineer's motion to dismiss (R.95-98, 27 4-77, 310). 
III. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a): "A person aggrieved by an order of the state 
engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section." 
Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-401(2): "A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that: ... (b) the court may 
relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) 
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion." 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal concerns UAC and SITLA's right to obtain judicial review of an order 
of the State Engineer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 and in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-401 and -402. The district court held it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over UAC and SITLA's petition for judicial review because neither was a 
party to the adjudicative proceeding before the State Engineer. (R.356-58.) The district 
court also found that UAC and SITLA did not exhaust all available administrative 
remedies but failed to consider whether they should be relieved of such requirements 
under the unusual circumstances of this case. (R.358-60.) UAC and SITLA appeal from 
the district court's final order and respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court. 
- 3 -
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On October 17, 2006, Appellee Central Iron County Water Conservancy District 
("CICWCD") filed an Application to Appropriate Water Number 69-101 (A76677) with 
the State Engineer, seeking to appropriate 12,000 acre feet ("af') of groundwater 
annually from Wah Wah Valley, Beaver County, Utah. (R.4 at~ 12.) Just over a month 
later, in November 2006, the State Engineer published notice of the application, as 
required by Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-6. (R.14.) Nearly four years later, in July 2010, the 
State Engineer conducted hearings on CICWCD's application. (R.4 at 116; R.16.) 
But it was not until May 13, 2014, that the State Engineer issued the Order for 
Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-101 (A76677) (the "CICWCD Order"). (R.5 at 
118; R.14-23.) The CICWCD Order approved CICWCD's appropriation of 6,525 af of 
water annually from the Wah Wah Valley. (Id.) On June 2, 2014, UAC and SITLA and 
Beaver County filed separate requests for reconsideration of the CICWCD Order. (R.5 at 
,r 21; R.107-18.) The State Engineer took no action on either request, and the requests 
were effectively denied on June 22, 2014. (See R.5 at~ 21.) 
On July 21, 2014, UAC and SITLA filed a petition for judicial review in the Fifth 
District Court, Beaver County, seeking de novo review of the CICWCD Order pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14. (R.1-37.) Neither the State Engineer nor CICWCD 
answered. Instead, the State Engineer moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1 ). (R.50-51.) 
CICWCD joined in the motion. (R.78-79.) UAC and SITLA opposed the motion with 
argument and a declaration of counsel. (R.84-251.) 
-4-
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The district court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition and 
granted the motion to dismiss. (R.320-29.) On October 8, 2014, the district court issued 
a final order and ruling. (R.351-61.) UAC and SITLA filed a notice of appeal on 
October 1, 2014 (R.331-33), and an amended and renewed notice of appeal on October 
10, 2014 (R.377-79). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. In 2006, CICWCD Applied for Significant Water Rights Far Outside 
Its Service Area, in the Desert Valleys of Beaver County. 
CICWCD is a water conservancy district serving certain municipalities and 
unincorporated areas in and around Iron County, Utah. (R.2 at ,r 5.) According to its 
own reports, by 2060, CICWCD will have a maximum water supply need of 11,470 af 
per year above its current needs. (R.3 at ,r 11.) To meet that need, on October 17, 2006, 
CICWCD sought significant water rights in Beaver County. (R.3-4 at ilil 11-15.) In three 
separate applications filed with the State Engineer, CICWCD applied to appropriate 
37,000 af of groundwater from Wah Wah, Pine, and Hamblin Valleys 1-over three times 
the water needed to meet its 2060 demands. (R.4 at ,r,r 12-15.) 
Beaver County lies to the north of Iron County, and the areas CICWCD serves are 
located considerable distances from Wah Wah, Pine, and Hamblin Valleys. For instance, 
CICWCD's service area is located in a drainage system completely separate from Wah 
1 As noted, Wah Wah, Pine, and Hamblin Valleys are located in Beaver County, 
although a portion of Pine and Hamblin Valleys extends into Iron County. The three 
valleys neighbor one another, with Pine Valley lying to the west of Wah Wah Valley and 
Hamblin Valley lying to the west of Pine Valley. (R.3 at ,I 8.) 
- 5 -
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Wah Valley's groundwater aquifer, and its high-demand areas are nearly 50 miles from 
the well sites in Wah Wah Valley. (R.5 at i122.) Despite the distance, CICWCD filed an 4v 
Application to Appropriate Water Number 69-101 (A76677), seeking to appropriate 
12,000 af of groundwater annually from Wah Wah Valley. (R.4 at ,I 12.) From Pine 
Valley, CICWCD applied to appropriate 15,000 af of groundwater annually, and from 
Hamblin Valley, 10,000 af of groundwater annually. (R.4 at 1il 13-14.) 
This appeal concerns CICWCD's application to appropriate groundwater from 
Wah Wah Valley. It was estimated that approximately 7,250 af of water was available 
for appropriation per year from Wah Wah Valley's groundwater system (R.3 at i19), and "' 
CICWCD's application sought to appropriate all of that water. In November 2006, just 
over a month after receiving CICWCD's application, the State Engineer published notice 
of the application. (R.14.) Publication of the notice triggered a 20-day window for 
persons interested in the application to file a protest with the State Engineer. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 73-3-7(1)(a). But it was not until July 2010 when the State Engineer 
conducted hearings on CICWCD's application. (R.4 at ,r 16; R.16.) 
2. In 2012, UAC and SITLA Applied for Water Rights in Wah Wah 
Valley for the Blawn Mountain Project. 
UAC and SITLA were not protestants to CICWCD's application and did not 
participate at the July 2010 hearing. (R.4 at il 17.) They did not for the simple reason 
that they had no interest in Wah Wah Valley's groundwater in either November 2006 or 
- 6 -
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July 2010.2 It was not until April 2011 that UAC entered into a three-year agreement 
with SITLA to explore a possible mining development to be located on SITLA-owned 
lands within Wah Wah Valley. (R.6 at ,r 27.) The development, known as the "Blawn 
Mountain Project," is composed of four areas of high-quality al unite ore covering 
approximately 11,500 acres. (R.6 at ,r 28.) Alunite is a sulfate mineral ore used in the 
production of sulphate of potash and alumina. (Id.) 
Current estimates indicate that the Blawn Mountain Project has a mine life of at 
least 40 years. (R.6 at ,I 30.) It requires 6,500 af of water annually. (R.7 at ,I 35.) Based 
on the water needed for the Blawn Mountain Project, on August 21, 2012, UAC and 
SITLA filed an Application to Appropriate Water Number 69-115 (A 79462). (R. 7 at ,r 
36.) The application sought to appropriate 6,500 af of groundwater annually from Wah 
Wah Valley. (Id.) The State Engineer published notice of the application in September 
2012. (R.187.) Based on its competing application for water rights in Wah Wah Valley, 
CICWCD protested UAC and SITLA's application. (R.7 at ,I 37.) 
The State Engineer held a hearing on UAC and SITLA's application in November 
2013. (R.7 at ,r 38; R.187.) At the time of the hearing, CICWCD's application for water 
rights in Wah Wah Valley had been pending before the State Engineer for over seven 
y~ars. Because UAC and SITLA and CICWCD maintained related and competing 
2 There are no factual allegations in the record regarding what interest UAC or 
SITLA may have had in Wah Wah Valley's unappropriated water before November 2006 
or July 2010. The factual allegations before the district court were limited to UAC and 
SITLA's petition for judicial review (R.1-37) and their opposition to the State Engineer's 
motion to dismiss (R.103-251 ). 
-7-
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applications, the State Engineer's office informed UAC that the State Engineer would 
consider and decide the applications together and issue an order on UAC and SITLA's 
application in conjunction with an order on CICWCD's application. (R.105 at, 9.) And 
as a protestant to the application, CICWCD fully participated in the hearing, asserting 
support for its application for rights to the same water source. (See R.7 at ,r 37; R.191.) 
In March 2014, SITLA granted UAC a long-term mining lease to develop and 
operate the Blawn Mountain Project. (R.6 at 'if 29.) To date, UAC has invested over $30 
million on activities relating to the exploration, permitting, and development of the 
project. (R.6 at ,r 31.) Construction of the Blawn Mountain Project is scheduled to begin " 
within three years. (R.7 at ,r 33.) It is estimated that the project will create over 2,500 
jobs during construction and as many as 500 jobs long term, and annually generate over 
$50 million in federal, state, and local taxes. (R.7 at ,r,r 33-34.) In addition to aiding the 
local economy, the project throughout its life will generate over $1.1 billion in mineral 
royalty payments to SITLA for the benefit of Utah's public schools. (R.7 at ,r 34.) 
3. In Orders Issued a -Day Apart, the State Engineer Granted CICWCD 
Perpetual Water Rights in Wah Wah Valley but Limited UAC and 
SITLA's Water Rights to a Fixed Term, Subject to CICWCD's Rights. 
The State Engineer issued the CICWCD Order on May 13, 2014-nearly eight 
years after publishing notice of CICWCD's application and nearly four years after 
holding a hearing on the application. (See R.5 at ,r 18.) In a second order issued the same 
day, the State Engineer approved CICWCD's appropriation of 15,000 af of water 




Engineer issued Order for Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-115 (A79462) in the 
names ofUAC and SITLA (the "UAC Order"). (R.7-8 at 'if 39.) 
The UAC Order approved UAC and SITLA's application for 6,500 af of water 
annually from Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 20-year period, subject to CICWCD's senior 
water right of 6,525 af annually. (Id.) The State Engineer later amended the UAC Order 
and issued Amended Order for Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-115 (A79462) 
(the "UAC Amended Order"). (R.8 at 'if 40; R.187-194.) The UAC Amended Order 
changed UAC and SITLA's annual water right from a fixed 20-year period to a fixed 30-
year period, still subject to CICWCD's senior water right. (Id.) 
Structuring the two orders in that way, the State Engineer anticipated that UAC 
and SITLA's and CICWCD's respective water rights in Wah Wah Valley could coexist, 
but they do not. (See R.191-92 (UAC Amended Order: "[I]t is believed that Water Right 
Numbers 69-101 and 69-115 can reasonably be expected to coexist due to several 
factors.").) The two orders leave UAC and SITLA without a secure water source for the 
Blawn Mountain Project. (See R.9-11.) The orders also leave them hostage to 
CICWCD's speculative development of a water right it does not need, as its future needs 
are already met by its water rights in Pine Valley. (See id.) 
Despite its senior water right, CICWCD filed a request for reconsideration of the 
UAC Amended Order. (R.196-99.) The State Engineer took no action on the request, 
and CICWCD filed a petition for judicial review on the UAC Amended Order. (R.201-
30.) UAC and SITLA also filed a petition for judicial review on the UAC Amended 
Order. (R.232-51.) Those petitions are pending before the district court. To date, 
- 9 -
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CICWCD has not obtained the required financing to develop its water rights in Wah Wah 
Valley. (R.6 at ,r 25.) Without a secure water right for the economic life of the Blawn 
Mountain Project, UAC will not be able to develop and operate the project. (R.8 at ,r 42.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
The district court erred as a matter of law finding UAC and SITLA had to be a 
"party" to obtain judicial review of the CICWCD Order. The district court ignored the 
express reference to a "person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(l)(a)-the specific and controlling statute-and the recognized 
difference between a "person" and a "party." (Emphasis added.) Based on the plain 
language of Section 73-3-14, the legislature did not limit judicial review of a State 
Engineer order to a "party" alone. To find otherwise, the district court improperly 
rewrote the statute, inferred a substantive term into the text that is not there, and acted 
contrary to the presumption that the legislature used each word advisedly. 
As "person[s] aggrieved" by an order of the State Engineer, UAC and SITLA have {:;., 
standing to seek judicial review so long as they exhausted available administrative 
remedies as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401. But the statute also provides that 
exhaustion is not required in every case. Exceptions to exhaustion requirements arise 
when the administrative remedies were inadequate, would serve no useful purpose, or 
result in irreparable harm. The district court, however, failed to consider whether UAC 
and SITLA may be relieved from exhaustion requirements. That was error given the 
nearly eight-year delay between the filing and decision on CICWCD's application, the 
change of circumstances that occurred over that time, UAC and SITLA's competing 
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application for rights to the same water, and the fact that the State Engineer considered 
·...:;J and decided the competing applications together. 
A. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Because UAC and SITLA Are "Person[s) Aggrieved" by the CICWCD 
Order, They Can Obtain Judicial Review of the Order Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a). 
1. The Plain Language of Section 73-3-14(l)(a) Allows a "Person 
Aggrieved" to Obtain Judicial Review of a State Engineer's Order and 
Does Not Limit Judicial Review to a "Party." 
The district court erred as a matter of law when it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-14(1)(a) to mean that only a "party" can seek judicial review of an order of the State 
Engineer. Secti~n 73-3-14(1)(a) grants standing to a certain class of individuals to seek 
judicial review of a State Engineer order: "[a] person aggrieved by an order of the state 
engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4 [of the 
UAPA], and this section." (Emphasis added.) Yet, according to the district court, 
Sections 630-4-401 and -402 of the UAPA limit judicial review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings before the State Engineer to only "parties." (R.356-58.) The district court's 
interpretation does not conform to well-settled statutory interpretation principles. 
A statute must be interpreted according to its plain language. Marion Energy, 
2011 UT 50, ,r,r 14-15 ("When the meaning of a statute can be discerned from its 
language, no other interpretive tools are needed." (internal quotations marks, brackets, 
and footnote omitted)). The courts must assume "that the legislature used each term 
advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning" and "presume[ ] that 
the expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Id. at 1 
- 11 -
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14 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted; brackets original). They cannot 
"infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there" or "rewrite the statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 
(Utah 1994). 
The plain language of Section§ 73-3-14(1)(a) does not require party status to 
obtain judicial review of an order of the State Engineer. It allows a "person aggrieved" to 
challenge an order. While neither Section 73-3-14 nor the remaining provisions of the 
water appropriation statute defines "person," the UAPA does: "an individual, group of 
individuals, partnership, corporation, association, ... governmental subdivision or its 
units, public or private organization or entity of any character, or another agency."3 Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(1)(g). "Party," however, is defined in more restrictive terms: 
"the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all 
persons permitted by the presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons 
authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding."4 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(l)(f). 
Thus a "person" and a ''party" are not the same. The remaining provisions of 
Section 73-3-14 confirm this, as the use of the term "person" in context verifies that a 
"person," as opposed to a "party," has standing to obtain judicial review of a State 
3 The State Engineer's regulations define "person" the same way. Utah Admin. 
Code R655-6-3(E). 
4 The definition of "party" under the State Engineer's regulations also follows the 
definition provided in the UAP A. Utah Admin. Code R655-6-3(F). 
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Engineer order. Section 73-3-14(3) addresses what "[a] person who files a petition for 
judicial review" must do when submitting a petition. In contrast, the following 
subsection, Section 73-3-14(4), addresses what, "[i]n addition to the requirements of 
Subsection (3), a protestant in the adjudicative proceeding who files a petition for 
judicial review" must do. (Emphasis added.) If only a "party" can seek judicial review, 
it makes no sense for the legislature to provide different requirements for "[a] person who 
files a petition" and "a protestant in the adjudicative proceeding who files a petition."5 
2. Section 73-3-14(1)(a) Controls the Right of Judicial Review of a State 
Engineer Order, Not the General Provisions of the UAPA. 
Despite the plain language of Section 73-3-14, the district court held that only a 
"party" to the adjudicatory proceeding has standing to obtain judicial review of a State 
Engineer order. (R.356-58.) The district court relied on Section 63G-4-401(1) of the 
UAPA, whic_h provides that "[a] party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action." (Id.) Sections 630-4-401(2) and (3) and 630-4-202 also refer to a 
"party" seeking judicial review. But the UAPA does not control the right to obtain 
judicial review of a State Engineer order; Section 73-3-14 does. 
"[I]t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind 
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter." Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314, 1318 (Utah 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The legislature 
5 The remaining subsections of Section 73-3-14 also refer to a "person" who seeks 
judicial review. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(6) (addressing what happens "[i]f a 
person who files a petition for judicial review fails to provide notice as required by this 
section"); Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(7) (addressing what "[a] person who files a petition 
for judicial review is not required to" do). 
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clearly had the UAPA in mind when it enacted Section 73-3-14, as the provision allows a 
"person aggrieved" by an order of the State Engineer to obtain judicial review in 
accordance with Chapter 4 of the UAPA.6 Moreover, to the extent the statutes conflict, 
"the more specific provision will prevail over the more general provision." Williams v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm 'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988). 
Williams illustrates that principle. There the Utah Supreme Court considered a 
petition for review of a rule adopted by the Public Service Commission. Id. at 43. The 
Court found a conflict between the Public Utilities Act and the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act (the "Rulemaking Act"), as the two statutes contemplated different 
procedures for review of proceedings before the Public Service Commission. Id. at 4 7-
48. On one hand, the Public Utilities Act required a party to file a request for rehearing 
with the commission before seeking judicial review of any commission order or decision. 
Id. at 46, 47. In contrast, the Rulemaking Act allowed a party to challenge a rule by 
seeking a declaratory ruling directly from a district court. Id. 
The Supreme Court found the procedures of the Public Utilities Act governed. Id. 
at 48. As the Court recognized, that statute specifically governed the hearings, 
proceedings, and methods used by the Public Service Commission to regulate and 
oversee public utilities and served no other purpose beyond the regulation of public 
6 Section 73-3-14 was amended in 1987 to provide that a person aggrieved by an 
order of the State Engineer could obtain judicial review following the UAPA. See 1987 
Utah Laws ch. 161, § 295. The prior version of the statute contained no reference to the 
UAP A. See id. In 2008, the legislature amended the statute to require a person seeking 
judicial review give notice to certain parties and made technical changes in reference to 
the UAPA. See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 165, § 1; 2008 Utah Laws ch. 382, § 2143. 
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utilities. Id. On the other hand, the Rulemaking Act governs all Utah administrative 
agencies and is used in any time of rulemaking. Id. The Court concluded the 
Rulemaking Act is "far more general in nature and is therefore superseded by the specific 
provisions contained in" the Public Utilities Act. Id. 
The UAPA's relation to Section 73-3-14 is no different. Section 73-3-14 
establishes the right of judicial review of a State Engineer order, and only addresses 
judicial review of such orders. Sections 630-4-401 and -402, on the other hand, are 
general enactments governing judicial review of final actions taken by every agency of 
the state. See Utah Code Ann. § 63 0-4-102( 1 ). Because the specific governs the 
general, the right of a "person aggrieved" to obtain judicial review under Section 73-3-14 
controls the general provisions of the UAPA. See Williams, 754 P.2d at 48; see also S. 
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands & Forestry of State, 830 P.2d 233,235 
(Utah 1992) (finding specific statute governing judicial review of actions of Division of 
State Lands controls general provision of UAP A). 
Based on the plain language of Section 73-3-14, the district court improperly 
rewrote the statute to find only a "party" is allowed to seek judicial review of the 
CICWCD Order and inferred a term that is not included in the text. Because the 
legislature is presumed to have used the term "person" advisedly in Section 73-3-14, the 
statute grants a "person aggrieved" standing to obtain judicial review and does not limit 
standing to a "party." See In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 1, 44-50, 175 P.3d 545 
(interpreting Utah Code Ann.§ 54-7-15(1) according to its plain language, and together 
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (renumbered as Section 630-4-401 ), to consider 
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whether classes of individuals other than parties had appellate standing). The district 
court's ruling was error and must be reversed as a matter of law. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed to Consider Whether UAC and 
SITLA May Be Relieved from the Requirement to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies Pursuant to Section 63G-4-401(2)(b) of the UAPA. 
Finding UAC and SITLA were not parties to CICWCD's application, the district 
court did not address whether UAC and SITLA were aggrieved by the CICWCD Order 
(R.351-61)-although they clearly are.7 The district court did find, however, that UAC 
and SITLA had not exhausted the available administrative remedies because they chose 
not to participate in CICWCD's application. (R.358-60.) On that basis too, the district 
court held UAC and SITLA have no right to judicial review of the CICWCD Order. (Id.) 
But the district court failed to consider or address whether UAC and SITLA should be 
relieved from the requirement of exhaustion. (R.3 51-61.) The district court erred when it 
did not consider that issue. 
1. Because Section 73-3-14 Grants a "Person Aggrieved" a Right to 
Judicial Review, the District Court Should Have Considered if UAC 
and SITLA Were Relieved from Exhaustion Requirements. 
As explained, Section 73-3-14(1)(a) grants a "person aggrieved" a right to judicial 
review in accordance with the UAPA. In tum, Section 63G-4-401(2) provides that "[a] 
7 In Washington County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ,r 
14, 82 P.3d 1125, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the meaning of"aggrieved" 
within Section 73-3-14 is consistent with traditional standing requirement that a plaintiff 
show particularized injury. The Supreme Court required the plaintiff to show some 
connection between its water source and the water use in question. 2003 UT 5 8, ,r 21. 
Because UAC and SITLA demonstrated a competing interest in the same water, they 
meet that requirement, but it was not an issue addressed to or by the district court. (See 
R.53-59, 78-79, 264-77, 305-11, 351-61.) 
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party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available." The provision also recognizes that exhaustion is not required in every 
instance: "the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are 
inadequate; or (ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(b). 
In addition, exceptions to exhaustion requirements "exist in unusual circumstances 
where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring 
such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it 
appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, 114 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ramsay v. Kane Cnty. Human 
Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, if 14, 322 P.3d 1163 (explaining exhaustion is not 
required where "exhaustion would serve no purpose, or is futile" (internal quotation 
marks and footnote omitted)). When applied, the exceptions should not undermine the 
rule's fundamental purpose. Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., Div. 
II, 2011 UT App 198, if 33,258 P.3d 619. 
It follows that the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement should not conflict 
with the "purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies ... to 
allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence-to 
make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot 
judicial controversies." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; ellipsis in original) 
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(quoting W. Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, il 18, 184 P.3d 578). In opposition to the 
State Engineer's motion to dismiss, UAC and SITLA argued exhaustion was not 
required; the administrative remedies available to them were inadequate, served no 
purpose, and would result in irreparable harm given the State Engineer decided the 
CICWCD Order and the UAC Amended Order together. (See R.95-98.) 
Pursuant to Section 63G-4-401 (2)(b) and Utah law, the district court should have 
considered the adequacy and purpose of the administrative remedies available to UAC 
and SITLA in light of the nearly eight-year delay between the publication of CICWCD's 
application and the issuance of the CICWCD Order. That delay prevented UAC and 
I 
SITLA 1rom protesting CICWCD's application in November 2006. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-3-7(.l)(a) (allowing persons interested in application to file protest with State 
Engineer 20 days after publication of notice of application). It also prevented UAC and 
SITLA from participating in the hearing in July 2010.8 See Utah Admin. Code R655-6-
1 l (limiting hearings to "all parties"); Utah Admin. Code R655-6-8 ("Intervention is 
prohibited except where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit 
intervention."). 
8 While the district court believed that UAC and SITLA could have intervened· in 
CICWCD's application, the State Engineer's administrative rules designate that all 
adjudicative proceedings are informal proceedings, Utah Admin. Code R655-6-2, and 
prohibit intervention in informal proceedings, Utah Admin. Code R655-6-8. According 
to the district court, UAC and SITLA could have changed CICWCD's application from 
an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding and then intervened. (R.360 ( citing Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 63G-4-202, -207).) But the court did not explain how UAC and SITLA, as 
non-parties, could have converted the proceeding when intervention was expressly 
prohibited in the first place. 
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Also relevant is the fact that the State Engineer weighed and decided CICWCD's 
and UAC and SITLA's competing applications for water rights in Wah Wah Valley 
together. The State Engineer's regulations require that an order stating his decision "shall 
be based on the facts appearing in any of the Division's files or records and on the facts 
presented in evidence at any hearings." Utah Admin. Code R655-6-16(A) (emphasis 
added). Here one of those files and one of those hearings involved UAC and SITLA's 
application for rights to the same water source, and CICWCD fully participated in that 
application to defend its interest in the water. (See R.191-92 (UAC Amended Order, 
addressing relation between CICWCD's and UAC and SITLA's interests).) Further, the 
district court should have considered the irreparable harm caused if exhaustion is· 
required. At stake is the beneficial use of water in Wah Wah Valley for the next 50 
years, which impacts not only the Blawn Mountain Project but the significant benefits to 
Utah's public school trust fund and Beaver County. 
In sum, the district court failed to consider or address whether UAC and SITLA 
should be relieved of exhaustion requirements as it should have. (R.351-61.) The 
circumstances here do not involve a situation where the person aggrieved failed to make 
known the nature of its rights in the course of the administrative proceedings before the 
State Engineer. The administrative record before the State Engineer was common to both 
the CICWCD Order and the UAC Amended Order, and the State Engineer applied its 
expertise addressing the same legal and factual issues. ( Compare R.14-23 with R.187-
94.) Indeed, the State Engineer gathered a full record and had every opportunity to 
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correct any error as he considered CICWCD's and UAC and SITLA's competing 
applications jointly. (See id.) 
2. Because the Circumstances in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan Are Far Different 
from the Unusual Circumstances in This Matter, the District Court 
Erred in Relying on the Decision. 
Contrary to the district court's ruling, these circumstances lie in stark contrast to 
those in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990). (See R.358-60.) In S & G, 
the evidence showed that the petitioner intentionally failed to participate in a hearing 
before the State Engineer on a change of use application, despite an existing interest. 797 
P.2d at 1086. Given that, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's ·argument that Gt 
it was a "person aggrieved" under an earlier version of Section 73-3-14. Id. at 1087-88. 
The Court reasoned that the requirement of participation ensures interested parties will 
bring all relevant facts to the agency's attention when the agency makes its decision and 
gives the agency notice of the identity and concern of interested parties. Id. Because the 
petitioner knowingly did not participate, it waived its right to judicial review. Id. 
S & G can be distinguished. First, the complete lack of participation that gave rise 
to the concerns there does not arise in this matter. The State Engineer was not deprived 
of the opportunity to hear or critically review UAC and SITLA's competing interest in 
the appropriation of water from Wah Wah Valley; nor was CICWCD. The State 
Engineer's almost eight-year delay in deciding CICWCD's application allowed him to 
fully weigh and consider the application together with UAC and SITLA's application. 
And, as explained, the issues raised to the State Engineer were the same issues raised to 
the district court. (See R.9-11.) 
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· . .,a 
Second, S & G addressed a prior version of Section 73-3-14 that did not expressly 
. incorporate the UAP A, as the current statute does. 797 P .2d at 1086 n.1 ( citing 1987 
Utah Laws ch. 161, § 295 ("Our decision reaches only the prior statute.")). Based on the 
current version of Section 73-3-14, the requirement of participation is colored by Section 
630-4-401 (2) and the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement-an issue not addressed 
in S & G. Third, there was no evidence before the district court that UAC and SITLA 
intentionally chose not to protest CICWCD's application after the State Engineer 
published notice in November 2006 or during the July 2010 hearing. As noted earlier (in 
footnote 2), nothing in the record shows what interest UAC and SITLA may have had in 
Wah Wah Valley's unappropriated water at those times. Nor could UAC and SITLA 
participate in the July 2010 hearing under the State Engineer's rules. See supra n.8. 
Thus, unlike in S & G, the purpose of exhaustion was fully satisfied before the 
State Engineer in this matter and any further requirement would serve no useful purpose 
here. The district court should have considered the exceptions to exhaustion under 









For the reasons above, UAC and SITLA respectfully request that the Court reverse 
the district court's dismissal of their petition for judicial review and remand this case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: February 11, 2015. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH ALUNITE CORP. and the UTAH 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
LANDS ADMINIS1RA TION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENT L. JONES, in his official capacity as 
the State Engineer, and CENTAL IRON 
COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER AND RULING ON 
STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 140500015 
Judge Paul D. Lyman 
The Respondent, Kent L. Jones, Utah State Engineer (hereafter "State Engineer", 
has filed the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
with an accompanying memorandum. The Petitioners, Utah Alunite Corp. (hereafter 
"UAC") and Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (hereafter 
"SITLA") have jointly filed an opposing memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a 
reply memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a Request to Submit. No party has 
filed a request for oral argument. 1 
FACTS 
For purposes of this Rule 12(b )( 1) motion the factual allegations of the Petitioners' 
Petition for Judicial Review are accepted as true. Hurst v. Highway Department, 397 
P.2d 71 (Utah 1964). The following facts, accepted as true, are cited as being relevant to 
this Ruling. 
1. Petitioners Utah Alunite Corp. and the Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration have petitioned for judicial review of the Order for 
Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-101(A76677), issued by 
Respondent Kent L. Jones, the State Engineer for the State of Utah on May 
13, 2014. 
2. Petitioner Utah Alunite Corp. is a Delaware corporation registered to do 
business in Utah and is in good standing. 
3. Petitioner Utah School and Institutional Trust lands Administration is an 
agency of the State of Utah. 
4. . Respondent Kent L. Jones is the State Engineer for the State of Utah, 
1 The Court entered its Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction on September 18, 2014. This Final Order reiterates, with a few minor 
typographical and punctuation corrections, the Court's ruling. 
Division of Water Rights. 
..a 5. Respondent Central Iron County Water Conservancy District (hereafter 
"CICWCD") is a water conservancy district serving certain municipalities 
and unincorporated areas in and around Iron County, Utah. 
v;J 
6. The District Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-3--14 (l)(a) and§ 630--4-402 (l)(a) . 
. ~ 7. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (l)(b) and§ 
630-4--402 (l)(b) because the water source at issue or a portion of the water 
source is located in Beaver County, Utah. 
·..;J 
8. The Wah Wah Valley, Pine Valley, and Hamblin Valley are located in 
Beaver County, Utah. Pine Valley is located directly to the west of the 
,...) Wah Wah Valley, and Hamblin Valley is located directly west of Pine 
Valley, along the Utah/Nevada border. 
9. On October 17, 2006, CICWCD filed an Application to Appropriate Water 
~ 
Number 69-101 (A76677) with the State Engineer, to appropriate 12,000 
acre feet (hereafter Haf') of water annually from groundwater in the Wah 
..i) Wah Valley for municipal uses, along with' applications to appropriate 
water in the two other neighboring valleys. 
10. Beaver County was a protestant of CICWCD' s application for an 
v;) 
appropriation of groundwater from the Wah Wah Valley, along with the 
Bureau of Land Management and hundreds of other protestants. 
v) 
·--~~1) 
11. Petitioners were not protestants to these applications. 
12. In July 2010, the State Engineer conducted hearings on CICWCD's 
applications in the Wah Wah and Pine Valleys. To date, no hearings has 
been held on CICWCD's application in Hamblin Valley. 
13. In April 2011, UAC entered into a three-year exploration agreement with 
SITLA for a mining development to be located on SITLA-owned lands 
within the Wah Wah Valley (known as the "Blawn Mountain Project"). 
14. On August 21, 2012, Petitioners filed an Application to Appropriate Water 
Number 69-115 (A 79462) to appropriate 6,500 af of water annually from 






CICWCD was a protestant to Petitioners' application. Beaver County 
expressed support for the application. 
The State Engineer heard petitioner's application Number 69-115 (A 79462) 
in November 2013. 
In March 2014, SITLA granted UAC a long-term mining lease to develop 
and operate the Blawn Mountain Project. 
On May 13, 2014, the State Engineer issued Order for Application to 
Appropriate Water No. 69-101 (A76677) in the name ofCICWCD. By the 
order, the State Engineer approved CICWCD's appropriation of6,525 af of 
water annually from the Wah Wah Valley for municipal use. 





Appropriate Water No. 69-115 (A79462) in the names of Petitioners. By 
the order, the State Engineer approved Petitioners' application of 6,500 af 
of water form the Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 20-year period, subject to 
CICWCD's senior water right of 6,525 af annually. 
On June 2, 2014, Beaver County and Petitioners filed separate requests for 
reconsideration of the CICWCD Order. The State Engineer denied both 
requests. 
21. On June 19, 2014, the State Engineer issued an Amended Order for 
Application to Appropriate Water no. 69-115 (A 79462) in the names of 
Petitioners. By this order, the State Engineer approved Petiti~ners' 
application for 6,500 af of water annually from Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 
30-year period, which was a 10 year period increase, subject to CICWCD's 
seni9r water right of 6,525 af annually. 
RULING 
Are UAC and SITLA "oarties" entitled to judicial review? 
.:. 
The Petitioners assert the right to bring this action pursuant to Section 73-3-14 (1) 
(a), Utah Code, wherein "A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may 
obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, ... " 
Section 630-4-402, Utah Code, details the law regarding judicial review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings. The complained of Order for Application to 
Appropriate Water No. 14-118 (A76676), the CICWCD Order is the product ofan 
informal adjudicative proceeding. Section 63G-4-402 (2)(a)(i) requires the name "of the 
party seeking judicial review." Sections 63G 4-4-2 (2)(a)(iv) and (vi) likewise refer to 
''parties" and "party" involved in the informal adjudicative proceeding. 
Similarly, Sections 63G-4-401, Utah Code Annotated limits judicial review 
actions to a '"party". (Note: all three subsections specifically reference a ''party" having 
certain rights.) Subsection 63G-4-103(l)(f) states the definition of the term ''party" as 
follows: 
"Party" means the agency or other person commencing an 
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the 
presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized 
by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
The Utah Rules of Administrative Code also restrict judicial review to "any party 
aggrieved." Rule 655-6-18.A. Rule 655-6-3.F defines the term "party" with slight 
variations as follows: 
"Party" means the Division (of Water Rights) or other person 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all 
persons permitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, 
and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties 
in an adjudicative proceeding. 
The problem UAC and SITLA have is that they simply do not fit under either 
definition of a ''party". They are not protestants, but SITLA could have been a 
protestant. UAC argues that it did not exist on October 17, 2006, when the subject 
application was filed. That is right, but its co-petitioner SITLA did exist and surely had 
land that would be impacted by the application. SITLA could have easily filed a protest, 
which would have enabled it to be a "party," SITLA would then be authorized to proceed 
in this action. 
UAC still did not exist in July 2010, when the hearings on the CICWCD 
application were held. SITLA did exist and could have belatedly sought to protest in that 
proceeding, if it had so desired. In addition, UAC did exist as of August 21, 2012, when 
if filed its own application with SITLA, based upon land SITLA owned. As the lessor 
and lease~ UAC and SITLA could have belatedly together sought to protest in the subject 
CICWCD application. 
The petitioners did not appear motivated to act until the State Engineer issued his 
ruling converting their application to a fixed period, subordinate to the CICWCD 
.. t 
application. · 
The fact of the matter is UAC and SITLA do not fit the definition of a party and 
they did not seek to protest and as such this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The 
motion of the State Engineer should be granted. The petitioners are not entitled to 
judicial review of the CICWCD application. 
II. If somehow UAC and SITLA are "parties" entitled to judicial review, have 
they exhausted their administrative remedies? 
Assuming that the Petitioners can somehow overcome their lack of "party" status, 
they then have to establish that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, before 
they can seek judicial review. Section 630-4-401 (2). They claim that the State Engineer 
considered both the CICWCD application and the Petitioners' application together, 
because CICWCD was a protestant of the Petitioners' application and participated in the 
November 2013 hearing on the Petitioners' application. Therefore, they have exhausted 
their remedies and should be allowed to proceed with this judicial review action. 
This case is very similar to the S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) 
case. In S&G the Intermountain Power Agency (hereafter IPA) filed a change 
application for some water rights it was purchasing from S&G. Rather than participate in 
the change application action, S&G chose to do nothing. IPA proceeded to the required 
hearing and the State Engineer took evidence and issued a ruling that S&G did not like. 
By contract IPA was to seek judicial review of that ruling but did not. S&G then 
belatedly tried to obtain a judicial review. The Court ruled that S&G lacked standing to 
/d.t-
.... ~0~ 
appeal because it had waived its right to participate at the appellate level through its 
intentional inaction at the administrative level. It had not exhausted its administrative 
remedies. 
SITLA is an owner of some of the land subject to the CICWCD water application. 
For some reason, SITLA did not protest or otherwise become involved in the 2006, 
CICWCD application. UAC gets its ability to appropriate water through its lease with 
SITLA. Thus, it is stuck with the land owner's actions. The hearing for the CICWCD 
claim was in July 2010. SITLA appears to have intentionally not participated in the 
CICWCD action before 2010 and it has made no attempt to become involved in it since 
2010. SITLA and UAC relied solely on their own application. 
As in S&G the intentional choice to not participate in or even attempt to intervene 
in another application waives the right to later participate. 
A claim that the Petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies in the 
CiCWCD application by taking action in only their own application, defeats the purpose 
of exhausting remedies in the CICWCD application. A party's judicial review right 
arises only in applications where the party fully participates. 
The Petitioners also argue that as proof of their exhaustion of their remedies, the 
court should note the decisions were issued on back to back days, March 13, 2014, and 
March 14, 2014. It might also be noteworthy that the Petitioner's water right is made 
junior to the CICWCD right. All of this is interesting, but not persuasive. The Supreme 




A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures that those 
who have an interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts 
and considerations at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover, 
the requirement of [participation] gives the agency and other participants 
notice of the identity and concern of interested parties." (citation omitted) 
These observations, although made in the context of a statutory requirement 
of party status, are applicable to any administrative decisions in which 
interested parties have the right to participate. The requirement of 
participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under 
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 
"may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine ... matters 
properly determinable originally by such agencies." ( citations omitted) 
S&O, Inc. y. Morgan, 797P.2d at 1087. 
The administrative remedy of intervention is accomplished by seeking to change 
the application from an informal to a fonnal adjudicative proceeding. Section 630-4-202 
{3) allows that to happen at anytime before a final order is issued. Converting 
CICWCD's application to a formal proceeding would have been a way for the Petitioners 
to intervene. Section 630-4-207. Thus, protecting their interest by fully participating in 
the CICWCD action. One can only guess at the outcome, but in theory the State 
Engineer may well have allowed intervention so as to deal with these competing claims 
simultaneously. However, the Petitioners chose not to seek to intervene in the CICWCP 
application. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioners are not parties to the CICWCD application. Without being 
parties, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioners, even if the non-party 
barrier is overcome, chose not to participate in the CICWCD application and to not fully 
exhaust their administrative remedies. Consequently the State Engineers Motion to 
Dismiss is granted. 
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73-3-14 Judicial review of state engineer order. 
(1) 
(a) A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, and this section. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is in the county in which the 
water source or a portion of the water source is located. 
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as a respondent in a petition to review the state engineer's 
decision, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation may be rendered against the 
state engineer. 
(3) A person who files a petition for judicial review as authorized in this section shall: 
(a) name the state engineer as a respondent; and 
(b) provide written notice in accordance with Subsection (5) to each person who filed a protest in 
accordance with Section 73-3-7 of: 
(i) the filing of the petition for judicial review; and 
(ii) the opportunity to intervene in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24. 
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsection (3), a protestant in the adjudicative proceeding 
who files a petition for judicial review shall also name as a respondent the person: 
(a) who requested the adjudicative proce~ding; or 
(b) against whom the state engineer brought the adjudicative proceeding. 
(5) The written notice required by this section shall: 
(a) be mailed: 
(i) within the time provided for by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b ); and 
(ii) to the address on record with the state engineer's office at the time the order is issued; and 
(b) include: 
(i) a copy of the petition; and 
(ii) the address of the court in which the petition is pending. 
(6) If a person who files a petition for judicial review fails to provide notice as required by this 
section, the court shall dismiss the petition without prejudice upon: 
(a) the motion of a party; 
(b) the special appearance of a person who: 
(i) participated in the adjudicative proceeding; and 
(ii) is not a party; or 
(c) the court's own motion. 
(7) A person who files a petition for judicial review is not required to: 
(a) notwithstanding Subsection 630-4-401 (3)(b), name a respondent that is not required by this 
section;and 
(b) notwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-402(2)(a)(iv), identify all parties to the adjudicative 
proceeding. 
Amended by Chapter 165, 2008 General Session 







Laws of Utah 1987 Ch. 161 
(!)_ _m ISueh) The state e~stneer shall publish 
notice [sh1lll-be -published! once each week for three 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circuJa. 
tion in the county in which the source of supply is 
located. 
{ill The notice shall contain (such) information 
[es-shall-appr45e] that will inform the public of the 
diligence claimed and the reason for the request. 
(_Q Any person interested may, ot any time within 
(30) 20 days ofter (eompledon-of-pubHeetion-of 
sueh-flolice,) the notice is published, me a protest 




{Bl In [the-eonsideredon-of] considering an appl• 
ication to extend the time in which to place water to 
beneficial use under an approved application, 
I whether-sueh-eppUeat ion-was-approved-befor-e-oF 
after-thHffectiw-dete-of-thls-ect.) the state engineer 
shall deny [sueh] the extension and declare the 
application lapsed, unless the applicant affirmatively 
shows that he has exercised or is exercising reason-
able and due diligence in working 1oward comple-
tion of the appropriation. 
®..fil If reasonable and due diligence is shown by 
the applicant, the state engineer shall approve the 
extension [whic-h-shall-bel: 
(ii) The approved extension ls effective so long as 
the applicant [shall-oontinue) continues to exercise 
reasonable diligence in completing the appropriatio 
[ f-PFOYided;-howeYff;-t-hat )! 
(i) The state engineer shall consider the holding of 
an approved application by any munlcipality, met-
ropolitan water district, or other public agency to 
meet the reasonable future requirements of 1he 
publlc(,shal~onsidered-by-the-5t ate-engineer) to 
be reasonable and due diligence within 1he meaning 
of this act. 
ill The state engineer, In acling upon requests for 
extension of time, may, if he finds unjustified delay 
or lack of diligence in prosecuting the works to 
completiont deny the [same] extension or may grant 
the request ln part or upon conditions, including a 






(2) !!!} An application upon which proof has not 
been submitted shall lapse and have no further force 
or effect after the expiration of SO years from the 
date of its approval[t-but-lf)! 
llu.J.f the works are conmucted with which to 
make beneficial use of the water applled for, the 
state engineer may, upon showing of [such} that 
fact, grant additional time beyond the SO-year 
period In which to make proof. 
Secllon 294, Secelon Amended. 
Section 73•3-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
amended to read: 
73.3.13. Protests• Procedure, 
(I) Any 01her applicant, or any user of water 
froni any river system or water source may (prolesl 
to] file a request for agency a_ction ...!llh the state 
engineer alleging that such work is not being dilig-
ently prosecuted to completion[,whe,eupon). 
ru.JJ..non receipt of the request for agel)£X..!Ction, 
the state engineer shall give the applicant (doing 
sueh-wefk-or-his-assignHixty,lays.Lrletiee-by- regt-










law) _notice and hold an adjudicative proceeding, 
m If diligence is not shown by the applicant! the 
~tale engineer may declare the application and all 
rights [thereundef) under it forfeited. [=f-he-deeision 
of-for-feitur-e-shall-be-t:inat-unless-an-aetion-to-r-evlew 
it-is-Jiled-as-provided-by-sectlen-+3-J-14. J 
Secllon 295. Seclion Amended, 
Section 73•3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 47, Laws of Utah 1986, 
is amended to read: 
73.3.14, Venue for Judlclal mlew • Slale 
engineer as defendant. 
(I) (a) Any [JtHny~se-where-a-dec-ision-of-the 








ehnnge-h--as-pr-oYided-b)'-laW;] an order of the state 
engineer may obtain judicial review by following the 
procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 
63, 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudi• 
cative proceedings shall be in the county in which 
the stream or wa1er source, or some parr of it, is 
located. 
ill The state engineer shall be joined as a defen-
dant in all suits to review his decisions, but no jud-
gment for costs or expenses of the litigation may be 








Secllon 296. Section Amended. 
Section 73•3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 160, Laws of Utah 










Ch.165 General Session - 2008 
CHAPTER165 
H.B.203 
Passed March 5, 2008 
Approved March 17, 2008 
Effective May 5, 2008 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE 
ENGINEER'S DECISION 
Chief Sponsor: Patrick Painter 
Senate Sponsor: Kevin T. VanTassell 
LONG TITLE 
General Description: 
This bill amends provisions relating to the judicial 
review of a state engineer decision. 
Highlighted Provisions: 
This bill: 
• requires a person seeking judicial review to: 
• name the state engineer, and in some cases 
the person who is the subject of the 
proceeding, as a respondent; and 
• give notice to a person who protested during 
the adjudicative proceeding; and 
• makes technical changes. 
Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
None 
Other Special Clauses: 
None 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
AMENDS: 
73-3-14, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1987, 
Chapter 161 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section '73-3-14 is amended to 
read: 
73-3-14. Judicial review of state engineer 
order. 
(1) (a) [Affyl A person aggrieved by an order of the 
state engineer may obtain judicial review ~ 
follawiag the pi:aee~es Ed Peqwrements aO in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 460. 
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section. -
(b) Venue for judicial review of an informal 
adjudicative [preeeedmgs shall be] proceeding is in 
the county in which tho [seam er] water source[;-8¼' 
same part af it,] or a portion of the water source is 
located. 
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as a 
(defe:ndaat] respondent in [alkwts] a petition to 
review [his deeieiens] the state engineer's decision, 
but no judgment for costs or expenses of the 
litigation may be rendered against [him] the state 
engineer. 
(3) A person who files a petition for judicial review 
as authorized in this section shall: 
(a) name the state engineer as a respondent; and 
(b) provide written notice in accordance with 
Subsection (5) to each person who filed a protest in 
accordance with Section 73-3-7 of: 
(i) the filing of the petition for judicial review; and 
(ii) the opportunity to intervene in accordance 
with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24. 
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsection 
(3), a protestant in the aqjuclicative proceeding who 
files a petition for judicial review shall also name as 
a respondent the person: 
1250 
(a) who requested the adjudicative proceeding; or 
(b) against whom the state engineer brought the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(5) The written notice required by this section 
shall: 
(a) be mailed: 
(i) within the time provided for by Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedw-e, Rule 4(b); and 
(ii) to the address on record with the state 
engineer's office at the time the order is issued; and 
(b) include: 
(i) a copy of the petition; and 
(ii) the address of the court in which the petition is 
pending. 
(6) If a person who files a petition for judicial 
review fails to provide notice as required by this 
section, the court shall dismiss the petition without 
prejudice upon: 
(a) the motion of a party; 
(b) the special appearance of a person who: 
(i) participated in the adjudicative proceeding; 
an 
(ii) is not a party; or 
(c) the court's own motion. 
(7) A person who files a petition for judicial review 
is not required to: 
(a) notwithstanding Subsection 63-46b-14(3)(b), 
name a respondent that is not required by this 
section; and 
(b) notwithstanding Subsection 









General Session - 2008 Ch.882 
(4) A person may not intervene in an enforcement 
action commenced under this section. 
(5) After issuance of a final order under rules 
made pursuant to Subsection (3)(c), the state 
engineer shall serve a copy of the final order on the 
person against whom the order is issued by: 
(a) personal service under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 5; or 
(b) certified mail. 
(6) (a) The state engineer's final order may be 
reviewed by trial de novo by the district court in: 
(i) Salt Lake County; or 
(ii) the county where the violation occurred. 
(b) A person shall file a petition for judicial review 
of the state engineer's final order issued under this 
section within 20 days from the day on which the 
final order was served on that person. 
(7) The state engineer may bring suit in a court of 
competent jurisdiction to enforce a final order 
issued under this section. 
(8) If the state engineer prevails in an action 
brought under Subsection (6)(b) or (7), the state 
may recover all court costs and a reasonable 
attorney fee. 
Section 2143. Section 73-3-14 is amended to 
read: 
73-3-14. Judicial review -- State engineer 
as defendant. 
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by an order of the 
state engineer may obtain judicial review by 
following the procedures and requirements of~ 
63, ChapteF 46h] Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be in the county in 
which the stream or water source, or some part of it, 
is located. 
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as a 
defendant in all suits to review ™61 the state 
engineer's decisions, but no judgment for costs or 
expenses of the litigation may be rendered against 
[him] the state engineer. 
Section 2144. Section 73-3-25 is amended to 
read: 
78-3-25. Well driller's license -- Bond --
Revocation or suspension for 
noncompliance. 
(1) (a) Every person that constructs a well in the 
state shall obtain a license from the state engineer. 
(b) The state engineer shall enact rules defining 
the form, the expiration date, and the renewal cycle 
of the application for a license. 
(c) Well drillers' licenses are not transferable. 
The state engineer shall enact rules for wel1 
construction according to the procedures and 
3808 
requirements of [Title 63, ChBJJter 46a] Title 630, 
Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemak.ing Act. 
(2) (a) (i) A person who constructs a well in this 
state must first obtain a license as provided in this 
section. 
(ii) Before a well driller's license will be issued, 
the applicant must file a well driller bond with the 
state engineer. 
(iii) The bond shall be made payable to the Office 
of the State Engineer. 
(iv) In accordance with [Title 63, ChapteF 4ea] 
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the state engineer may make rules 
to set the amount, form, and general administrative 
requirements of a well driller bond. Proper 
compliance with the provisions of this section and 
the rules enacted under the authority of this section 
are required to obtain or renew a license. 
(b) (i) Well drillers shall comply with the rules 
enacted by the state engineer under this chapter. 
(ii) If the state engineer detennines, following an 
investigation, that the licensee has f ai1ed to comply 
with these ru1es, the state engineer may revoke or 
suspend the license, and exact the bond and deposit 
the money as a nonlapsing dedicated credit. 
(iii) The state engineer may expend the funds to 
investigate or correct any deficiencies which could 
adversely affect the public interest resulting from 
noncompliance with the rules promulgated under 
this chapter by any well driller. 
(iv) The state engineer may refuse to issue a 
license to a well driller if it appears that there has 
been a violation of the rules or a failure to comply 
with Section 73-3-22. 
Section 2145. Section 73-8-29 is amended to 
read: 
73-3-29, Relocation of natural streams --
Written permit required -- Emergency 
work -- Violations. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a state 
agency, county, city, corporation, or person may not 
relocate any natural stream channel or alter the 
beds and banks of any natural stream without first 
obtaining the written approval of the state 
engineer. 
(2) (a) The state engineer may issue an 
emergency permit or order to relocate a natural 
stream channel or alter the beds and banks of a 
natural stream as provided by this Subsection (2) 
and Section [83 46h 20] 630-4-502. 
(b} If an emergency situation arises which 
involves immediate or actual flooding and 
threatens injury or damage to persons or property, 
steps reasonably necessary to alleviate or mitigate 
the threat may be taken before a written permit is 
issued subject to the requirements of this section. 
(c) (i) If the threat occurs during normal working 
hours, the state engineer or [ms] the state 
engineer's representative must be notified 








63G-4 .. 401 Judicial review .... Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where 
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, 
except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any 
other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
(3) 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the 
date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued· or is considered to have been 
issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b ). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall 
meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code 
63G-4-402 Judicial review -- Informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) 
(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting 
from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over 
all state agency actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (1 )(a)(i) as determined administratively under 
Section 78A-6-1106; and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of Child and Family 
Services, after an evidentiary hearing. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, in the county 
where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's principal place of business. 
(2) 
(a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a copy, summary, 
or brief description of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that 
led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) 
(a) The court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any constitutional 
issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section. 
Amended by Chapter 208, 2011 General Session 
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